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Abstract
Syntactic approaches in the philosophy of science, which are based on
formalizations in predicate logic, are often considered in principle inferior
to semantic approaches, which are based on formalizations with the help of
structures. To compare the two kinds of approach, I identify some ambigu-
ities in common semantic accounts and explicate the concept of a structure
in a way that avoids hidden references to a specific vocabulary. From there, I
argue that contrary to common opinion (i) unintended models do not pose
a significant problem for syntactic approaches to scientific theories, (ii) syn-
tactic approaches can be at least as language independent as semantic ones,
and (iii) in syntactic approaches, scientific theories can be as well connected
to the world as in semantic ones. Based on these results, I argue that syntac-
tic and semantic approaches fare equally well when it comes to (iv) ease of
application, (iv) accommodating the use of models in the sciences, and (vi)
capturing the theory-observation relation.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of scientific theories needs some framework—a way in which the-
ories and possibly the world are described and, building on that, a set of tools
for analysis. Suppes (1968, 654–656) argues that formal frameworks in particular
allow for descriptions and analyses that are explicit, objective, and standardized,
abstract from non-essential aspects and help in identifying self-contained, mini-
mal assumptions. More specifically, he argues that these rewards can be reaped
by using formalizations in set theory or first order predicate logic (Suppes 1968,
653). Presumably, he would also argue that formalizations in higher order logic
and model theory can lead to the same rewards.
The earliest of such formal accounts, developed within logical empiricism
and especially by Carnap and Hempel, has been dubbed the ‘Received View’. It
relies on formalizations of scientific theories in languages of predicate logic and
assumes that the non-logical vocabulary V is bipartitioned into a setB of basic
terms (or “observational terms”) and a set A of auxiliary terms (or “theoretical
terms”), where only the basic terms are directly interpreted. The interpretation
of the auxiliary terms is fixed only by the interpretation of the basic terms, the
formalization of the theory, and additional sentences (correspondence rules) con-
taining both basic and auxiliary terms. The Received View is often regarded as su-
perseded by frameworks in which scientific theories are assumed to be formalized
in model or set theory, which I will call semantic approaches.1 Calling frameworks
that rely on formalizations in predicate logic of first or higher order ‘syntactic’,
the Received View is a specific syntactic approach that additionally assumes a bi-
partition of the vocabulary and allows a direct interpretation only of the basic
terms.2
While the additional assumptions of the Received View have been widely criti-
cized, syntactic approaches in general have often been dismissed with reference to
criticisms of the Received View. In this article, I will argue that this was a mistake,
and defend syntactic approaches (but not the Received View) relative to semantic
approaches. Syntactic approaches are widely thought to suffer from a number
of shortcomings: Unlike semantic approaches, syntactic approaches (i) cannot
avoid unintended models, (ii) are language dependent, (iii) require and have failed
to provide an account of the relation between language and the world, (iv) lead
to cumbersome descriptions of scientific theories, (v) do not allow the treatment
of models, and are therefore at odds with actual scientific practice, and (vi) pre-
sume a misleading or false relation between theory and observation. I will argue
that if the first three of these problems can be solved for semantic approaches,
they can be solved for syntactic ones as well. That the same holds for the last
1I will use ‘approach’ and ‘framework’ interchangeably in the following.
2Although this categorization of syntactic and semantic approaches is standard terminology,
it is somewhat incongruous: Set theory and predicate logic can both be used as foundational lan-
guages in which to formalize other theories. Model theory, on the other hand, is one of those
theories that can be so formalized. I will discuss this point further at the end of §4.
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three problems then follows easily. In discussing the relative merits of syntactic
approaches, I will ignore the ontological question of whether theories can be iden-
tified with either kind of description (or, for that matter, with platonic objects,
sets of propositions, thoughts, actions, connection weights in brains, combina-
tions thereof. . . ). Given that scientific theories are typically not formalized in
either kind of framework, they are probably ontologically different from both
kinds of descriptions.3
Given its thesis, this article can probably count as a contribution to the “end-
less silly, largely unpublished debates over what semantic approaches can do that
syntactical or statement approaches intrinsically cannot” that Suppe (2000, S103)
laments. There are still justifications for its existence. First, beyond the intrin-
sic strength of formalizations in predicate logic, my discussion also covers the
connection between a theory’s description and the world, the relation between
formalizations in set and model theory, and the language independence of the
approaches. Hence at most some of it is silly. Second, even if the debates are silly,
many philosophers of science do hold the view that an analysis of science better
use a semantic approach, and sometimes make it sound like semantic approaches
are intrinsically superior. After all, Suppe (1974b, 114) himself claims early in
the history of the discussion that “if formalization is desirable in a philosophical
analysis of theories, it must be of a semantic sort”. And looking back at the de-
velopments since he made this claim, Suppe (2000, S110, my emphasis) concludes
that “by construing theories in terms of families of models, semantic analyses—
and they alone—have real potential for parlaying such new philosophical wisdom
[gained by focusing on models] into enhanced understanding of theories”. These
claims suggest, at least on the surface, that there is an intrinsic advantage of seman-
tic approaches. Third, if the debates are silly, it might be a good idea to finally put
them to rest. This, incidentally, is what I would like to contribute to. As a first
step, I may note that this contribution to the debates is meant to be published.
2 Translating between sentences and models
According to van Fraassen (1980, 44),
[t]he syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with a body of theo-
rems, stated in one particular language chosen for the expression of
that theory. This should be contrasted with the alternative of present-
ing a theory in the first instance by identifying a class of structures
as its models. In this second, semantic, approach the language used
to express the theory is neither basic nor unique; the same class of
structures could well be described in radically different ways, each
with its own limitations.
3The question what scientific theories really are may also simply not be well-defined, so that
there is no fact of the matter.
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In the semantic approach, a theory is thus formalized by a class of structures, in
the syntactic approach by a set of sentences. It seems plausible that every syntactic
description of a scientific theory can be captured by a semantic one, because any
set Σ of sentences determines the set S of its models through the mapping
Φ :Σ 7→ S := {S |S Σ} . (1)
Σ has a fixed vocabularyV , containing mi -place predicates Pi , n j -place functions
F j , constants ck , and in higher order logic their respective types. V does not
disappear by the mapping Φ, since every structure S ∈ S contains a mapping
from every element of V to an extension with the corresponding arity and type
(Hodges 1993, 2–4; Chang and Keisler 1990, §1.3). Call the arities and types of the
extensions the similarity type of V . V and its similarity type, sometimes called
the ‘signature ofS’ can thus be read off uniquely fromS (Hodges 1993, 4).4
However, Φ does lose some information because it cannot distinguish be-
tween equivalent sets of sentences, that is, if Σ  Θ, then Φ(Σ) = Φ(Θ). This
can pose problems, for example when modifying a theory: One formulation of a
theory can be vastly superior to an equivalent one when it needs to be generalized
or adjusted, as van Fraassen (1980, §3.5) has pointed out. Relatedly, the formula-
tion is also relevant when it comes to the inductive support of components of
the theory: If the data support one postulate but not another, a formulation that
keeps the two postulates separate is arguably better than one that contains a single
postulate equivalent to their conjunction. Thus, if irrelevant conjunctions indeed
pose a problem for an explicatum of ‘confirmation’ (cf. Fitelson 2002), the possi-
bility of reformulating a theory allows hiding the conjunction, and thus making
the irrelevant conjunct harder to detect. And if the problem of irrelevant con-
junctions can only be solved by distinguishing between equivalent formulations,
then it cannot be solved within a semantic approach.5
The loss of distinction between equivalent sets of sentences does not pose a
problem, however, if the results of an analysis of a scientific theory are invariant
under the theory’s equivalent reformulation; and outside of questions of induc-
tion, many interesting analyses of scientific theories are so invariant. Conversely,
it is often considered a problem if an analysis of the theory is not (witness, for
example, Hempel 1965, §§4–5; Carnap 1956, 56; Winnie 1970, 294–295).
Conversely, any set of structures S yields a set of sentences Σ through the
mapping
Ψ : S 7→Σ := {ϕ |S  ϕ for allS ∈ S} . (2)
Ψ(S) is thus the set of sentences true in all elements of S. For many logics, Ψ is
not the inverse of Φ. For instance, S may not be closed under elementary equiv-
alence, while for first order logic, Φ(Ψ(S)) is. Of course, the set S′ := Φ(Ψ(S))
4This is discussed at length in §3.
5This, of course, assumes semantic approaches that indeed do not incorporate a theory’s specific
formulation.
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of structures is mapped onto itself by Φ ◦Ψ and the set Σ ′ := Ψ(Φ(Σ)) of sen-
tences is mapped onto itself by Ψ ◦ Φ. For such sets of sentences and sets of
structures, Φ and Ψ are therefore inverses. Call the class of models of a single
set of first order sentences ∆-elementary. It is known that there are classes of re-
lational first order structures that are not ∆-elementary, but are complements of
∆-elementary classes, or are unions of∆-elementary classes. All and only classes
that are unions of∆-elementary classes are closed under elementary equivalence,
where two structures are elementarily equivalent if and only if they are models of
the same first order sentences (Bell and Slomson 1974, 141–144). Call two struc-
tures that are models of the same sentences of some given logic syntactically equiv-
alent in that logic. Higher order logic can often distinguish between elementary
equivalent but non-isomorphic structures, and the use of logics that allow formu-
las with infinitely many quantifiers, conjuncts, or disjuncts further increases the
number of classes for which Ψ is the inverse of Φ. For simplicity, I will assume
in the following that each class S of structures under discussion either can be cap-
tured by a single set of sentences of the respective logic (so that Φ(Ψ(S)) = S) or
is not closed under syntactical equivalence.
As a matter of principle (that is, independently of the logic used), Ψ always
loses information because it cannot distinguish between two non-identical,
element-wise isomorphic sets of structures, that is, if for each S ∈ S, there is a
T ∈ T with S ' T and vice versa, then Ψ(S) = Ψ(T) even if S 6= T.6 However,
if the results of an analysis of a scientific theory are invariant under isomorphic
transformations of theories (a natural demand that is usually fulfilled),7 this does
not pose a problem.
It is sometimes claimed that as a matter of principle, more information is
lost in the mappingΨ than the distinction between isomorphic structures. Suppe
(2000, S104), for example, argues that syntactic approaches are in principle unable
to capture some scientific theories, because for syntactic descriptions
the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem implie[s] that [ . . . ] models must
include both intended and wildly unintended models. Unintended
models provide potential counterexamples.
Blocking them more concerns eliminating syntactical-approach
artifacts than dealing with substantive analysis. [ . . . ] For example,
Kitcher’s (1989) unification explanation account has a very simple
idea. But he develops it syntactically spending most of the paper try-
ing to block unintended consequences that are artifacts of his formal-
ism. [ . . . ]
This is the correct sense of [the] claim symbolic logic is an inap-
propriate formalism.
6Note that this is a weaker condition than the pointwise isomorphism defined by Halvorson
(2012, 190).
7See, for example, van Fraassen’s notion of a theory (van Fraassen 2008, 238; cf. 2002, 22).
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First and foremost, Suppe’s criticism is not directed at syntactic approaches
(or symbolic logic) in general, because the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not
hold in higher order logic. And while there are structures that even in predicate
logic of transfinite order cannot be described up to isomorphism (Enderton 2009,
§2, §4), set theory itself can be described up to isomorphism by (and only by) the
addition of axioms about the existence of specific inaccessible cardinals (Väänä-
nen 2001, 516), which is enough to capture the analyses in semantic approaches.
Since the proof theory of higher order logic is not complete for full semantics
(Väänänen 2001, 505), entailment needs to be defined semantically in terms of
structures. Luckily, there is no good reason to disallow the use of structures in
syntactic approaches, since syntactic approaches presume only that scientific the-
ories can be analyzed by way of their description in predicate logic. They do not
presume that the analysis itself must proceed wholly in the object language. In
fact, the use of formal models to define entailment was even part of the Received
View (Lutz 2012b, 83).
Second, for predicate logic of any order, some structures can be characterized
in that language up to isomorphism, so that there are no unintended models.
The standard examples of structures that cannot be captured in first order logic,
e. g. the natural numbers and the reals, can be described up to isomorphism in
finite order logic if a full semantics is assumed (Enderton 2009, §2).8 And if the
theory has a finite domain, all elementarily equivalent structures are isomorphic
(Hodges 1993, §2.2, ex. 5).
Third, whether the existence of unintended models poses a problem depends
on the kind of analysis sought after. The answers to questions that can be phrased
in the object language, for example, do not depend on isomorphism, since oth-
erwise they would provide a means of distinguishing between non-isomorphic
models. And an analysis that requires isomorphism in only a finite subdomain
of the theory’s domain (for example in the domain of observations) is immune
to the problem even in a first order language. The mapping Ψ of a syntactic de-
scriptions of observations can in general be inverted by Φ, since the number of
observations will always stay well below any inaccessible cardinal.
Finally, Suppe’s criticism rests on an equivocation of ‘unintended model’ and
‘non-standard model’, the latter referring to a model that is syntactically equiva-
lent but not isomorphic to a standard model. Even though Kitcher spends a lot of
work blocking unintended consequences, the unintended consequences are not el-
ementarily equivalent to intended ones and can therefore be blocked by syntactic
means of first order. Kitcher’s account is a good example of how difficult it can be
to develop a formalization of an idea, but not of a failure of a syntactic approach
because of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. Put crudely, if the unintended con-
sequences could be blocked by using a predicate logic of higher order, Kitcher
would probably not have shied away from it for lack of a complete proof theory.
8Leivant (1994, §3.1, §5.4) and Väänänen (2001, 504–505) discuss the difference between full
semantics and Henkin semantics. I will come back to this in §4.
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3 Language independence
According to the quote by van Fraassen (1980, 44) above, “the same class of struc-
tures could well be described in radically different ways, each with its own limi-
tations”, and in the words of Suppe (1989, 4), the semantic approach
construes theories as what their formulations refer to when the for-
mulations are given a (formal) semantic interpretation. Thus, ‘seman-
tic’ is used here in the sense of formal semantics or model theory in
mathematical logic.
French and Ladyman (1999, 114–115) similarly assume that the structures used in
semantic approaches do not contain a vocabulary when they discuss a criticism
of semantic approaches they attribute to Mauricio Suárez: If a semantic approach
uses models as they are defined in model theory, it is still dependent on a language,
since a model “is a structure and an interpretation of a formal language in terms
of that structure (that is, a map from the symbols of the syntax to elements of the
structure)”. If models are taken to involve such a mapping, French and Ladyman
(1999, 114) write,
it is clear that the celebrated claim of the linguistic independence of
considering models (and not first-order formalizations of theories),
stressed by adherents of the semantic approach as giving it a clear
advantage over the syntactic view, is simply not true.
They quote a concurring passage by van Fraassen (1989, 366):
The impact of Suppes’s innovation [switching to models] is lost if
models are defined, as in many standard logic texts, to be partially
linguistic entities, each yoked to a particular syntax. In my terminol-
ogy here the models are mathematical structures, called models of a
given theory only by virtue of belonging to the class defined to be
the models of that theory.
“Thus,” French and Ladyman (1999, 115) conclude, “van Fraassen should be inter-
preted as talking about structures by those who wish to understand model in the
sense of the ‘standard logic texts’”.
However, it is not exactly clear what French and Ladyman mean by ‘struc-
ture’, except that it contains the extensions of symbols, and not the symbols itself.
They do claim that van Fraassen’s “emphasis on structure is compatible with this
definition of model theory from a contemporary textbook”, according to which
model theory “is the study of the construction and classification of structures
within specified classes of structures”. Of course, everything in this quote from
Hodges (1993, ix) depends on his definition of ‘structure’. A few pages further on
(Hodges 1993, 1), there is evidence that his definition might not be what French
and Ladyman think it is:
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Model theorists are forever talking about symbols, names and labels.
A group theorist will happily write the same Abelian group multi-
plicatively or additively, whichever is more convenient for the matter
in hand. Not so the model theorist: for him or her the group with
‘·’ is one structure and the group with ‘+’ is a different structure.
Change the name and you change the structure.
One of the reasons that Hodges (1993, 2) gives for this focus on symbols is that
we shall often want to compare two structures and study the homo-
morphisms from one to the other. What is a homomorphism? [ . . . ]
[A] homomorphism from structure A to structure B is a map which
carries each operation of A to the operation with the same name in B .
But, of course, it is the definition of a structure that shows whether symbols play
a role in model theory. Here is, for example, the part of his definition that deals
with relations (Hodges 1993, 2, my notation):
For each positive integer n [a structure contains] a set of n-ary rela-
tions on |A| (i. e. subsets of |A|n), each of which is named by one or
more n-ary relation symbols. If R is a relation symbol, we write RA
for the relation named by R.
It is clear that the symbols play an important role in a structure: They identify
the extensions by naming them.
French and Ladyman would have found a definition better suited to their
position in a less contemporary textbook (Bell and Slomson 1974, §3.2) in which
a relational structure is an ordered pair
A= 〈A,{Rn | n ∈ω}〉 ,
where [ . . . ] for n ∈ ω Rn is a finitary, say λ(n)-ary relation on A.
[ . . . ] The relational structure A will count as an interpretation of
the language L [= {Pn : n ∈ ω}] if the degrees of the relations Rn
correspond to the degrees [δ(n)] of the predicate letters Pn . That
is, for n ∈ ω, δ(n) = λ(n). In this case we say that the relational
structureA is a realization of the language L and that L is appropriate
for the structure A.
This definition of what one could call ‘pure structures’ (Smith 2008) seems to be
used by many proponents of the semantic approach (e. g., da Costa and French
1990, French and Ladyman 1999). It is free of any specific vocabulary up to the
vocabulary’s similarity type, that is, any appropriate vocabulary can be used with
the structure.
A structure A = 〈A,I 〉 contains an interpretation I mapping, say, the re-
lations {Pi}i∈I , from a vocabulary V to their extensions, {PAi | i ∈ I }. A pure
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structure, on the other hand, contains instead an indexed set {PAi }i∈I of exten-
sions.9 But this introduces a vocabulary through the back door: The mapping
from I to the set {PAi | i ∈ I } that is needed to define such an indexed set is is
the same as an interpretation with the vocabulary I . Any claim that I is not a
vocabulary but an index set has to rely on commitments (or rather declarations)
outside of the formalism.
Suppes (2002) writes structures as tuples with the domain as first ele-
ment, which can avoid this hidden dependence on a specific vocabulary:
Tuples may, for example, be introduced as primitives, with axioms like
〈a1, . . .an〉 = 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 ⇔ a1 = b1, . . . ,an = bn . They may also be defined
through sets, as in Kuratowski’s definition. Of course, one can still introduce
a vocabulary by assigning, for example, natural numbers to the positions of
the tuple, but this assignment is not unique. In fact, any mapping from a well-
ordered index set with the right cardinality would do. (The common method of
representing a tuple 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 as a set of pairs {〈1,a1〉, . . . , 〈n,an〉} again intro-
duces a specific vocabulary, the natural numbers {1, . . . , n}.10) The possibility of
assigning a vocabulary to a tuple cannot be avoided, since the ordering of the
extensions is essential. One could not just drop the ordering by, for example,
using a multiset of extensions instead of a tuple, as an example by Halvorson
(2012, 192) makes clear: Let
Θ  {∃=1x(x = x)} (3)
and
Λ  {∃=1x(x = x)} ∪ {∀x(Q0x→Qi x | i ∈N} (4)
be theories described in the vocabulary V = {Qi | i ∈ N0}. The two theories are
not logically equivalent and thus do not have the same class of models. However,
if structures were defined without any order of their extensions, then the two
theories would have the same models: Every model of Λ is trivially a model of Θ.
Conversely, any model of Θ in which the extension of every predicate contains
the one element of the domain is a model of Λ. If in a model ofΘ some extension
is empty, make it the extension of Q0 (which is possible, since the extensions are
not ordered), so that the model is a model of Λ as well. Thus every model of Θ
is a model of Λ and vice versa. Therefore, if the extensions in a structure are not
ordered, semantic approaches in principle cannot distinguish all those theories
that can be distinguished syntactically.
Thus even when trying to avoid a specific vocabulary, something like a tuple
is needed for the definition of a pure structure. But since structures can have infi-
nite vocabularies and tuples are finite, pure structures cannot be tuples if they are
9It is clear from their use ofω as an index set that Bell and Slomson (1974) intend ‘{Rn | n ∈ω}’
to be an indexed set, in my notation ‘{Rn}n∈ω’ (rather then the set of the indexed set’s elements).
For if R2 = R3, then {Ri}i∈{1,2,3} 6= {Ri}i∈{1,2}, while

Ri | i ∈ {1,2,3}
	
=

Ri | i ∈ {1,2}
	
; Bell and
Slomson thus need indexed sets to allow for different names with identical extension.
10This, incidentally, is the vocabulary that Carnap (1958, 242) chooses to name physical objects.
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to be able to express anything that structures can express. In line with the possi-
bility of assigning any finite well-ordered index set to tuples, I therefore suggest
to let a pure structure Aˆ contain a domain A and a mapping from an arbitrary
and not fixed well-ordered index set to a set of extensions on the domain. That
the index set is not fixed can be captured by identifying any two mappings that
only differ in their index sets:
Definition 1. A representative of a pure structure Aˆ is a triple 〈A,a,≺〉, where
a : I −→I (V ) is a mapping from the index set I to the image of an interpretation
I , and ≺ is a well-ordering of I . Two triples 〈A,a,≺〉 and 〈A,a′,≺′〉 represent the
same pure structure, [〈A,a,≺〉] = [〈A,a′,≺′〉], if and only if there is an order
isomorphism f : I −→ I ′ and a ◦ f = a′.
The use of an interpretation I is simply a way to ensure that a maps only to
set theoretical objects that can be extensions of predicate, function, or constant
symbols. The definition determines a tuple if and only if the index sets of the
representatives are finite. In both the finite and infinite case, the order of the
objects in I (V ) is preserved as in an ordered set, and additionally, elements of
I (V ) can occur repeatedly as in a multiset.
Definition 1 does not introduce a specific vocabulary, and is as language inde-
pendent as the use of tuples: Even if not represented as a mapping from natural
numbers to extensions, a tuple can be assigned a well-ordered index set, and this
definition of pure structures only makes this possibility explicit. To stress the
point: The infinity of vocabularies in definition 1 is not artificially introduced.
Both indexed sets and tuples assume some specific set or multiple sets of enti-
ties that provide a vocabulary. Index sets can be used as vocabularies immediately,
since they are already mappings from some set to a set of extensions. Tuples are ei-
ther defined as a mapping from a range of natural numbers to a set of extensions
or allow the introduction of such a mapping without any further assumptions
except about the elements of the index set. In definition 1, the identification of
structures with different index sets avoids this one further assumption.
Muller (2010) has suggested a conception similar to definition 1 for the use in
semantic approaches, but he considers his conception an extension of semantic
approaches, and justifies it with the need to connect theories to the world with
its help. I will briefly revisit Muller’s suggestion for connecting theories to the
world below; at this point I only want to stress (again) that definition 1 is not an
extension of the concept of a structure used in semantic approaches, but rather
an acknowledgment of the infinity of vocabularies implicitly contained in it.
In the definition of ‘structure’ given by Bell and Slomson (1974), the index
set I plays the role of the set of relation symbols {Pi | i ∈ I } used by Chang
and Keisler (1990) and Hodges (1993). For examples relevant in the following,
see the definitions of ‘reduct’, ‘isomorphism’, and ‘substructure’ by Chang and
Keisler (1990, 20–23) and by Bell and Slomson (1974, 153, 73), respectively. Defini-
tion 1 requires a somewhat more elaborate modification of standard definitions,
of which I will only give the modification for the notion of embedding. Since
10
Sebastian Lutz What’s Right With a Syntactic Approach?
Figure 1: Functions between arbitrary represen-
tatives of two structures Aˆ = [〈A,a,≺〉], Bˆ =
[〈B , b ,≺′〉] so that Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ.
I I (V ) A
J J (V ′) B
a
g
b
h
pure structures are given by classes of mappings with well-ordered index sets, em-
beddings between pure structures can be defined via a bijection between the index
sets of their representatives and a function from one pure structure’s domain to
the other’s. In this definition (which I give only for pure first order structures),
the position in the ordering of the index sets plays the role of the element of the
vocabulary.
Definition 2. A pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in a pure first or-
der structure Bˆ if and only if for any two representatives Aˆ = [〈A,a,≺〉] with
a : I −→ I (V ) and ≺ an ordering on I , and Bˆ = [〈B , b ,≺′〉] with b : J −→
I (V ′) and≺′ an ordering on J , there is an order isomorphism g : I −→ J and an
injective mapping h : A−→ B such that
1. for all c ∈ I mapped to constants by a, h(a(c)) = b (g (c)),
2. for all F ∈ I mapped to n-ary functions by a and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,
h
 
a(F )(x1, . . . , xn)

= b
 
g (F )

(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)), and
3. for all P ∈ I mapped to n-ary relations by a and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a(P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ b (g (P )),
h is called an embedding of Aˆ in Bˆ. If h is surjective, Aˆ and Bˆ are called isomor-
phic.
Embeddability of pure structures only has to be shown for one representative
of each pure structure:
Lemma 1. Pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in pure first order structure
Bˆ if and only if there are two representatives Aˆ = [〈A,a,≺〉] with a : I −→ I (V )
and ≺ an ordering on I , and Bˆ = [〈B , b ,≺′〉] with b : J −→ I (V ′) and ≺′
an ordering on J , an order isomorphism g : I −→ J , and an injective mapping
h : A−→ B such that conditions 1–3 of definition 2 are fulfilled.
Proof. The proof from left to right is immediate. For the other direction, assume
[〈A, c ,≺∗〉] = Aˆ with c : K −→ I (V ) and [〈B , d ,≺′∗〉] = Bˆ with d : L −→
I (V ′). By definition 1, there are order isomorphisms i : K −→ I and j : J −→ L
(see figure 2). Then there is an order isomorphism k : K −→ L and a one-to-one
mapping h : A−→ B such that
1. for all m ∈ K mapped to constants by c , h(c(m)) = h ◦ a ◦ i(m) = b ◦ g ◦
i(m) = b ◦ j−1 ◦ j ◦ g ◦ i(m) = d ( j ◦ g ◦ i(m)) = d (k(m)),
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Figure 2: Functions between four
representatives of two structures
Aˆ = [〈A,a,≺〉] = [〈A, c ,≺∗〉],
Bˆ= [〈B , b ,≺′〉] = [〈B , d ,≺′∗〉].
K
I I (V ) A
J J (V ′) B
L
c = a ◦ ii
k = j ◦ g ◦ i
a
g
b
j
d =
b ◦ j
−1
h
2. for all F ∈ K mapped to n-ary functions by c and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,
h
 
c(F )(x1, . . . , xn)

= h
 
a ◦ i(F ))(x1, . . . , xn)

= b ◦ g ◦ i(F )(h(x1), . . . ,
h(xn)) = b ◦ j−1 ◦ j ◦ g ◦ i(F )(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)) = d (k(F ))(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)),
and
3. for all P ∈ I mapped to n-ary relations by c and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ c(P )⇔ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a ◦ i(P )⇔ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a ◦ i(P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ b ◦ g ◦ i(P )⇔ 〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ b ◦ j−1 ◦ j ◦ g ◦
i(P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ d (k(P ))
The definition of embedding for pure structures respects the standard defini-
tion of embedding for structures (Hodges 1993, 5) in that there is a connection
between structures and pure structures, and under this connection, the two defi-
nitions of embedding are interchangeable. More precisely, any structure A gives
rise to a representative of a pure structure Aˆ by a well-ordering of its vocabulary,
and any pure structure Aˆ contains a structure A among its representatives. From
the definition of embedding for pure structures, it follows that a pure structure
Aˆ can be embedded in a pure structure Bˆ if and only if they are represented by
some structures A andB with the same vocabulary and the same ordering of the
vocabulary, and A can be embedded inB:
Claim 2. Pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in pure first order Bˆ if and
only if there are first order structures A = 〈A,I 〉 and B = 〈B ,J 〉 and a well-
ordering≺ such that Aˆ= [〈A,I ,≺〉], Bˆ= [〈B ,J ,≺〉], and A can be embedded in
B.
Proof. For the proof from left to right, choose any representatives 〈A,a,≺〉 of
Aˆ and 〈B , b ,≺′〉 of Bˆ. Now choose for V the index set of a, I = a, and J =
b ◦ g , where g is the order isomorphism from I to J . The claim follows from
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definition 2 because for any Q ∈ V , h(QA) = h ◦a(Q) = b ◦ g (Q) =J (Q) = QB
in the domain of Aˆ, which is also the domain of A.
For the proof from right to left, choose g = id. The claim follows with
lemma 1 because for any Q ∈ V , h(I (Q)) = h(QA) = QB =J (g (Q)).
Putting it slightly differently, Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ if and only if for any
two structures A and B that represent, with a common well-ordering of their
vocabulary, Aˆ and Bˆ, A can be embedded inB:
Corollary 3. Pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ if and only if for
any structures A = 〈A,I 〉 and B = 〈B ,J 〉 and any well-ordering ≺ such that
Aˆ= [〈A,I ,≺〉] and Bˆ= [〈B ,J ,≺〉], A can be embedded inB.
Proof. Immediately from claim 2 and lemma 1.
Conversely, a structure A can be embedded in a structure B if and only if,
under some well-ordering of their vocabulary, they represent pure structures Aˆ
and Bˆ, respectively, such that Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ. The proof assumes the
axiom of choice.
Corollary 4. First order structure A = 〈A,I 〉 can be embedded in B = 〈B ,J 〉 if
and only if [〈A,I ,≺〉] can be embedded in [〈B ,J ,≺〉] for some well-ordering ≺.
Proof. Note that I andJ must have the same vocabulary. The proof from right
to left follows immediately from theorem 2. For the proof from left to right, note
that any vocabulary V can be well-ordered (assuming the axiom of choice). The
claim again follows immediately from theorem 2.
Again, putting this slightly differently, A can be embedded in B if and only
if under any well-ordering, they represent pure structures Aˆ and Bˆ, respectively,
such that Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ:
Corollary 5. First order structure A = 〈A,I 〉 can be embedded in structure
B = 〈B ,J 〉 if and only if [〈A,I ,≺〉] can be embedded in [〈B ,J ,≺〉] for all
well-orderings ≺.
Proof. Immediately from corollary 4 and lemma 1.
These results show that language independent pure structures and typical
model theoretic operations between them are well-defined. It also shows that
nothing is lost by discussing embeddings only for structures or only for pure
structures. Language independence can be achieved at any point by introducing
an ordering for the vocabulary, turning the structures into representatives of pure
structures. Conversely, the ordering can be eliminated at any point in the discus-
sion by choosing, for all pure structures at once, one of the possible vocabularies.
It is clear that other model theoretic notions besides embedding have similar ana-
logues for pure structures.
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The independence from a specific vocabulary that French and Ladyman
(1999) call ‘much celebrated’ seems indeed important, since language is inher-
ently conventional, or at least relative to a group of speakers. Understanding
‘propositions’ “in the medieval sense of the term”, that is, as “interpreted sen-
tences of some particular language” Suppe (1974a, 204–205), argues that therefore
theories cannot be the propositions in which they are formulated:
Suppose a theory is first formulated in English, and then is translated
into French. The English formulation and the French formulations
constitute different collection of propositions; if theories were collec-
tions of propositions, then the translation of the theory into French
would produce a new theory; but, of course, it does not—it is the
same theory reformulated in French.
Suppe’s point is clear: The ideal gas law does not change only because one uses
the names ‘pression’, ‘volume’, ‘constante de Boltzmann’, and ‘températur’ in-
stead of ‘pressure’, ‘volume’, ‘Boltzmann constant’, and ‘temperature’. The use
of structures as defined above avoids the use of any specific vocabulary, and thus
supports the claim by van Fraassen (1989, 222) that “in discussions of the struc-
ture of theories [language] can largely be ignored”.
The simultaneous switch of all structures to pure structures indeed leads to
a freedom to choose between an infinity of vocabularies, and thus the freedom
from any specific one. So assume that two models A and A′ of two sets of sen-
tencesΘ in V andΘ′ in V ′, under some order of their vocabularies, represent the
same pure structure Aˆ. Then the models are reducts of a structure B in V ∪V ′
which is a model of both Θ and Θ′. But B is also a model of identity claims
between any two elements of V and V ′ that have the same position in the pure
structure. In the vocabulary V ∪V ′, each symbol of V can thus be used as the
definiens of the symbol of the same position in V ′ and vice versa. These iden-
tifications therefore allow the definitional extension of either set of sentences to
the other. Since explicit definitions are non-creative, neither set of sentences gains
content by the addition of the definitions, and thus it is possible to go from, say,
Θ to Θ′ by first extending Θ through the definitions and then eliminating the
V -symbols from the resulting theory. The effect, of course, is a simple renaming
of the symbols.
However, the semantic view is too liberal in its neutrality with respect to the
vocabulary, for not every renaming makes sense. In the ideal gas law, for exam-
ple, the translation should allow the renaming of ‘températur’ into ‘temperature’,
but not into ‘pression’. For syntactic approaches, this restriction on renamings
can be expressed by introducing analytic sentences. Any renaming not entailed
by analytic sentences is not allowed. Then, ‘temperature’ can be renamed as ‘tem-
pératur’, but not as ‘pression’.
There is another problem with arbitrary renaming, for it is not only too
liberal in some respects, but also too restrictive in others. It does not, for example,
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avoid the language dependence referred to by Suppe (1974a, 204–205), who notes,
relying on the medieval notion of ‘proposition’, that
quantum theory can be formulated equivalently as wave mechanics
or as matrix mechanics; whichever way it is formulated, it is the same
theory, though its formulations as wave mechanics will constitute a
collection of propositions which is different from the collection of
propositions resulting from its formulations as matrix mechanics.
Obviously, the difference between matrix mechanics and wave mechanics goes
beyond a mere renaming of the predicate-, function-, and object-symbols. And
this is a problem for semantic approaches, because if more than the names of the
extensions changes, the pure structures change as well. Hence when Hendry and
Psillos (2007, 137, my emphasis) in connection with matrix and wave mechanics
state that “a (semantic) model of one could be turned into a model of the other”,
they effectively point out that the classes of pure structures are not the same.
Halvorson (2012, §4.2) gives much more precise examples.
The use of explicit definitions can again provide a solution to this dependence
on language and structure. So far, I have used only the simplest kind of definition,
an identification of symbols. But the comparison of two theories can be general-
ized to include any kind of explicit definitions. Two theories Θ,Θ′ are definition-
ally equivalent if and only if both can be extended by explicit definitions such
that they become equivalent. Then their models can be turned into each other
by a procedure analogous to the one described above: First expand the model of
one theory to include the defined symbols of the definitions. This expansion is
unique. Then reduce the resulting interpretation to the vocabulary of the other
theory (cf. Hodges 1993, 61). This allows the identification of theories that differ
not only in the vocabulary they use, but also in the structures of their models.
The procedure therefore also allows for structural differences in the description
of theories, and thus can not only be used to extend syntactic approaches, but
also semantic ones.11 This move would also not obviously tether semantic ap-
proaches to syntactic ones because the notion of definitional equivalence can be
defined without reference to sets of sentences (de Bouvère 1965).
4 Sentences, structures, and the world
A setΣ of sentences of predicate logic is not enough for applying a theory to the
world, for ifA Σ , any set of the same cardinality as A can be made into a model
of Σ as well:
Claim 6. Let |A|= A and card(A) = card(B). Then there is aB'A with |B|= B.
11There is no obvious reason why the identification of theories could not be relaxed even further.
One could, for example, identify theories Θ in T and Λ in L if and only if Θ can be definition-
ally extended to entail Λ and vice versa. Once this step is taken, one could consider two theories
identical when they are mutually reducible in one or another sense of reducibility.
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Proof. If card(A) = card(B), then there exists a bijection g : A −→ B . For each
relation PAi in A, define P
B
i := g (P
A
i ), for each function f
A
j and each tuple b¯ ∈
B n j (or arguments for functions of higher order), define f Bj (b¯ ) = g ( f
A
j (g
−1 b¯ )),
and for each constant cAk , define c
B
k
:= g (cAk ). It is straightforward to show that
B'A.
Corollary 7. Let A  Σ and card(A) = card(B). Then there is a B with |B| = B
andB Σ .
Proof. From claim 6, because sets of sentences can determine structures at most
up to isomorphism.
Considering that any bijection between a set and the domain of A will do for
the proof of claim 6, it is clear that any element of A can be exchanged for any
other element. In light of claim 7, it is clear that a set of sentences can be con-
nected to the world (beyond statements about the number of its objects) only if
there is a way to distinguish between isomorphic structures. One way of solving
this problem is by introducing a set of possible structures M, which is determined
by the extensions of the V -terms given their meaning. M allowsΣ to make more
than cardinality claims about the world by defining the possible models of Σ as
the possible structures that are models of Σ . The use of possible structures does
not have to trivialize syntactic approaches (by allowing all semantic tools): One
can postulate that the set M of possible structures only distinguishes between iso-
morphic structures, so that the isomorphic closure of M is always the class of all
V -structures. Then it is easy to show that the isomorphic closure of the possible
models of Σ is always the class of all models of Σ—in other words, in syntactic
approaches, non-isomorphic structures have to be distinguished by sentences of
the object language.
In the Received View, an interpretation maps the basic (“observational”) vo-
cabulary to extensions that contains objects of the world. This gives a general
way of connecting syntactic descriptions to the world: The interpretations given
by their possible models map at least one symbol to an extension that contains
an object of the world—a worldly extension, as I will call it from now on. Interpre-
tations with a worldly extension are accordingly worldly interpretations, and the
analogous holds for models and structures.
If there are worldly structures, syntactic descriptions can be given a formal
connection to the world by relying on worldly possible structures. These can
be given by actually showing (pointing to) members of worldly sets and relying
on the psychological fact of intersubjective agreements about similarity between
experiences (Przełe˛cki 1969, 35–38). More commonly, the worldly sets are de-
scribed in a metalanguage (thereby leaving out the question of how the terms of
the metalanguage are connected to the world). As van Fraassen (1989, 222) puts
it: “Any effective communication proceeds by language, except in those rare cases
in which information can be conveyed by the immediate display of an object or
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happening”. Either solution assumes that it is possible to build sets out of worldly
objects. Since an interpretation maps to such sets, it is also assumed that it is pos-
sible to have a function from a vocabulary to worldly extensions. I will discuss
the presumptions of these assumptions below.
The connection to the world has sometimes been claimed to be a strong point
of semantic approaches, because they escape the problem of connecting linguistic
entities to the world (Chakravartty 2001, 327). However, the connection between
pure structures and the world is not completely straightforward either:
Corollary 8. Let
Aˆ = A and card(A) = card(B). Then there is a Bˆ ' Aˆ withBˆ= B.
Proof. From claims 6 and 3.
Thus just as syntactic approaches must have a means to distinguish between
isomorphic structures, semantic approaches must have a means to distinguish
between isomorphic pure structures. This suggests a more precise distinction be-
tween syntactic and semantic approaches:
Definition 3. Syntactic approaches describe theories with sentences in the object
language and with structures. Non-isomorphic structures are only distinguished
by sentences in the object language.
Definition 4. Semantic approaches describe theories with pure structures.
Semantic approaches thus distinguish between isomorphic and non-isomorphic
pure structures by a (set theoretic) description of the pure structures.
How the connection between pure structures and the world is to be envisaged
in semantic approaches depends on whether the pure structures are meant to
be worldly or non-worldly. Suppe’s statement quoted in section 3 that semantic
approaches construe theories as the formal referents of the theories’ formulations
(see page 7) suggests that the pure structures used in semantic approaches contain
worldly extensions, that is, are worldly themselves. Da Costa and French (2000,
fn. 2) also seem to assume that the pure structures are worldly when they state
that “the set-theoretic models are constructed in set theories with Urelemente
(individual[s], systems, portions of the universe, real things,. . . ).”
A pure structure has as one of its representatives a structure (with a vocab-
ulary), and accordingly the existence of a worldly pure structure entails the ex-
istence of a worldly structure. This structure then provides the connection of
the linguistic entities with the world. Therefore, if a semantic approach success-
fully connects theories to the world by using pure worldly structures, syntactic
descriptions can be connected to the world as well.12
12For pure structures taken as indexed sets along the lines of Bell and Slomson (rather than
equivalence classes of indexed sets), the modification of the discussion is straightforward: The index
set I can be used directly as a vocabulary, providing the interpretation a : I −→ a(I ). If a specific
vocabulary V is desirable, any isomorphism g : V −→ I leads to the interpretation I = a ◦ g :
V −→ a(I ). The discussions below can modified analogously.
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Mostly, however, the pure structures discussed in semantic approaches are not
supposed to be worldly (see, e. g., French and Ladyman 1999). They are simply
abstract set theoretic entities—no dogs, observations, or electrons are members
of the sets. Theses non-worldly pure structures then have to be connected to the
world somehow. I will discuss four ways to do so.
In the first way, the theory described by pure structures is supposed to be iso-
morphic to some worldly pure structure.13 But because of corollary 6, if the the-
ory is about more than just the cardinality of its domain, there has to be one dis-
tinguished isomorphism (with an order isomorphism g between the index sets)
or a set of distinguished isomorphisms that connect each non-worldly pure struc-
ture Aˆ= [〈A,a,≺〉] with those worldly pure structures that the theory structure
is supposed to refer to. The result is again a worldly pure structure, since for
each g and worldly pure structure Aˆ, [〈A,a ◦ g , g−1(≺)〉] is again a worldly pure
structure, and thus the previous discussion applies.
As another way to connect a non-worldly pure structure to the world, Muller
(2010) suggests taking a pure structure (which he takes to be a tuple), and allowing
it to be assigned any compatible vocabulary. The vocabulary can hence be cho-
sen according to expedience. The connection to the world is then given through
an interpretation of the vocabulary. It is clear that this approach to connecting
semantic descriptions to the world presumes that it is possible to connect syn-
tactic descriptions to the world. Note also that Muller is basically describing a
non-worldly pure structure, since the index set of the structure can be assigned
any vocabulary, that is, any other index set. It is thus doubtful that Muller in fact
provides a solution to the problem.
A third way to connect non-worldly pure structures to the world is to claim
that the pure structure and the system it is meant to represent are similar. French
and Ladyman (1999) argue successfully that the similarity relation, left largely
unexplicated, is too vague to be of much use. Thus even if, within the boundaries
of its vagueness, theories can be connected to the world by similarity, the success
of this approach has been achieved only by significantly lowering the precision
of the analysis. Assuming that both syntactic and semantic approaches aim for
more precision, this solution therefore at best achieves a different goal.
French and Ladyman (1999, 115, cf. 113) argue instead that the connection to
the world is simply not a problem to be solved by semantic approaches:
The theoretical models [the pure structures of the theory] are held to
relate to models of the phenomena and these are just other structures.
That these represent real events and processes cannot be determined
by the content of the theory, but is a pragmatic fact about our lan-
guage [ . . . ] and it is unreasonable to demand that the semantic view
explains the nature of representation in general.
13In semantic approaches, isomorphisms are often used as analogues to Tarski’s definition of
truth.
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This clearly falls short of the idea that semantic approaches are easier to connect
to the world than syntactic approaches. Without an account of the relation be-
tween theories and the world, French and Ladyman’s stance also completes a ter-
minological confusion: Because of their reliance on possible structures, syntactic
approaches are semantic, and now, stripped of their connection to the world and
relying on pure structures, semantic approaches stay on the level of the language
of set theory, and hence are purely syntactic.
In French and Ladyman’s approach, structures are simply set theoretic con-
structs, and thus their view is very close if not identical to that of the structural-
ists following Sneed (1971) and Stegmüller (1979), whose formal core commit-
ment is to the expression of scientific theories in terms of set theory. In such a
structuralist approach, there is simply one set of set theoretic sentences (those
describing the phenomena) that are distinguished as representing real events. It is
of historical interest to note that the idea to connect the sentences of a language
to the world by determining their relations to a distinguished subset of the whole
set of sentences of the language goes back to Neurath (1932), who postulated the
translatability of all scientific sentences into protocol sentences (cf. Carnap 1932).
If neither predicate logic nor set theory are given a formal connection to the
world, they are simply languages that are assumed to describe the world in some
not further specified way. Then, for example, the question of non-standard mod-
els does not even arise (neither for first order nor higher order logic, nor set the-
ory) unless an additional metalanguage is artificially introduced (Väänänen 2001).
If there is a metalanguage, however, set theory and higher order logic are equally
expressive (Väänänen 2001, 506–507). The discussion in §2 about the possibilities
to capture structures up to isomorphism therefore stacks the deck against syntac-
tic approaches: It rests on the heroic assumption that set theory is not a language
that describes the world, but is the world (more precisely: the world is a worldly
structure), and the task of syntactic approaches is to describe the set theoretic
world. If one instead treats, with French and Ladyman, set theory as just another
language (which it is), it cannot describe the world more precisely than higher
order logic.14
Without a direct relation to the world, structuralism’s one plausible advan-
tage is that it unifies scientific theories: Many mathematical concepts can be
defined through the membership relation, which becomes the only non-logical
mathematical constant. Many claims about the defined constants thereby become
theorems of the definitional extension of the axioms of set theory. If furthermore
non-mathematical concepts are also identified with set theoretical entities (e. g.,
time identified with the reals), whole scientific theories can be definitional exten-
sions of the axioms of set theory. The difference between structuralism and syn-
tactic approaches excluding the semantics of syntactic approaches then amounts
to structuralism’s restriction to set theory, and no such restriction on the side of
14Väänänen (2001) further argues that neither set theory nor higher order logic can describe the
world more precisely than first order logic.
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syntactic approaches. If a theory is formalized in structuralism, switching to a
syntactic approach would thus allow the abstraction from all terms that do not
originally occur in the formalized theory, including the membership relation. A
structuralist formalization, on the other hand, would cease to be structuralist
if one abstracted from the membership relation. In the terms of Hilbert (1900,
1092–1093), syntactic approaches apply the axiomatic method of formalization,
while structuralism applies the genetic method.15
In conclusion, then, the connection to the world is equally problematic for
syntactic and semantic approaches. And a solution for one approach, for example
the pragmatic one suggested by van Fraassen (2006), also provides a solution for
the other.16
5 Corollaries
I have so far argued directly against the position that syntactic approaches are
untenable. I now want to discuss briefly why not all syntactic approaches must
rely on first order logic or exhaustive axiomatization, use partial interpretations,
or ignore the role of scientific models. These features are commonly associated
with the Received View, but do not have to be presumed by syntactic approaches
in general.
5.1 The use of higher order predicate logic
Second order logic is already enough “to capture directly most all mathematical
practice” (Leivant 1994, 260; cf. Väänänen 2001, 515), and capturing mathemati-
cal practice only gets easier for higher orders. On the other hand, it is impossible
to capture mathematical practice directly (that is, without significant reformula-
tion) in first order logic (Leivant 1994, 279). It would thus be very problematic
if syntactic approaches were in general restricted to first order logic. But this
restriction is already historically inaccurate with respect to the Received View
(Lutz 2012b, §2), which should be a hint that it is an inappropriate restriction for
syntactic approaches in general. A possible justification of the restriction may be
the absence of a complete proof theory in higher order logic, which leads to a
loss of the nice features of first order logic described by Rantala (1978), and also
makes it necessary to use model theory and thus structures when determining
which statements are entailed by a set of sentences. However, there is no good
15This fits also with the claim of Sneed’s adviser that “the basic methods appropriate for ax-
iomatic studies in the empirical sciences are not metamathematical (and thus syntactical and se-
mantical), but set-theoretical” (Suppes 1954, 244). Incidentally, in structuralism the genetic method
is clearly understood as a reductive explication in the sense of Benacerraf (1965, III.B), since, for
instance, no-one would assert that time is the set of reals.
16I have argued that solutions for semantic approaches are also solutions for syntactic approaches.
The argument for opposite direction can rely on the fact that every structure represents a pure
structure and, if needed, corollary 5.
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reason to disallow the use of structures in a syntactic approach. As argued in sec-
tion 4, syntactic approaches need possible worldly structures for making more
than cardinality claims about the world. But the use of a set of worldly structures
that is not closed under isomorphism is, if anything, more problematic than the
use a set of non-worldly structures closed under isomorphism. Thus, given that
model theory only needs such non-worldly structures, there seems to be no fur-
ther problem for using entailment as a means of inference. As pointed out in §2,
semantic entailment was also used in the Received View.
5.2 The impracticality of syntactic axiomatizations
Sometimes, syntactic approaches are considered to be unable or at least to cum-
bersome to capture mathematical practice because they are assumed to demand
exhaustive axiomatizations, which require explicitly writing out all axioms for
all terms that occur in a theory (cf. Stegmüller 1979, Suppes 1992). Semantic ap-
proaches, on the other hand, are taken to allow non-exhaustive axiomatizations.
But of course, both an axiomatization in a syntactic approach and an axiomati-
zation in a semantic approach can be non-exhaustive. Within the Received View,
Carnap explicitly argues for the necessity of non-exhaustive axiomatizations, and
also gives guidelines on which axioms to include and which steps of an inference
to spell out in detail (Lutz 2012b, §3). (Carnap does insist that in principle, well-
developed theories can be exhaustively axiomatized, but there is no reason that
syntactic approaches have to insist even in principle on exhaustive axiomatiza-
tion.) Conversely, a scientific theory may well be given in an exhaustive axioma-
tization of set theory like ZFC or an exhaustive axiomatization of model theory.
5.3 Models
Unlike semantic approaches, syntactic approaches are often considered to be in-
hospitable for scientific models (cf. Frigg and Hartmann 2008, §4.1). This view
is typically based on, first, a confusion of the Received View with syntactic ap-
proaches in general, and second, a misunderstanding of the Received View (Lutz
2012b, §4). Here, I want to point out that semantic approaches cannot simply be
assumed to incorporate scientific models on the basis that semantic approaches
involve model theory and ‘model theory’ contains the word ‘model’: Scientific
models like the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus are, without reformu-
lation, not the same as the structures of model theory.17 With this ambiguity
resolved, it becomes clear that syntactic approaches are as hospitable to models as
semantic ones under either interpretation of ‘model’. For if ‘model’ is understood
model theoretically (that is, synonymously to ‘structure’), then the possibility of
using higher order logic allows capturing structures up to isomorphism (modulo
17The influential argument to the contrary by Suppes (1960) relies on reformulations of scientific
models and the assumption that only the formal parts of models are important (cf. Lutz 2012b, 97–
99).
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an assumption about inaccessible cardinals), and the use of possible structures
allows distinguishing isomorphic structures. Furthermore, semantic approaches
relying on pure structures involve structures only indirectly, as representatives of
pure structures (semantic approaches relying on indexed structures involve struc-
tures directly, with the index set as the vocabulary). If, on the other hand, ‘model’
refers to scientific models, then the question is whether semantic approaches can
describe the world (or anything that is not a pure structure, for that matter) bet-
ter than syntactic approaches. I have answered this question in the negative in §2
and §4.
5.4 Partial interpretations and correspondence rules
Suppe (1974a, 114) concludes that
it is amply clear from the discussion of the observational-theoretical
distinction and correspondence rules above that many of the epistem-
ically relevant distinctions concerning theories cannot be drawn syn-
tactically, and thus that the Received View’s insistence on axiomatic
canonical reformulation is untenable. Hence, if formalization is de-
sirable in a philosophical analysis of theories, it must be of a semantic
sort.
But Suppe’s argument does not support his conclusion. For Suppe only criticizes
the Received View’s assumptions about the relation between theory and observa-
tion. And the partition of V into basic and an auxiliary terms, the direct inter-
pretation of only the basic terms, and the interpretation of the auxiliary terms
through the interpretation of the basic terms and the correspondence rules are
specific to the Received View and obviously independent from the decision be-
tween syntactic and semantic approaches. For there is no reason why a syntac-
tic approach cannot rely on possible structures that directly interpret all non-
logical constants. As I have argued in §4, this does not trivialize the distinction
between syntactic and semantic approaches. Historically, Feigl (1950, “personal
postscript”), for example, did not endorse the view of a partial interpretation of
the vocabulary of theories, even though he clearly was a proponent of syntactic
approaches, and even something very close to the Received View.
Not only is Suppe’s argument invalid, Suppe himself shows that his conclu-
sion is also wrong: His criticism of correspondence rules (Suppe 1974a, II.E) is
based on his presentation of the hierarchy leading from observations to theories
developed by Suppes (1962). His description, however, is itself phrased in syntac-
tic terms (cf. Suppe 1974a, 108, n. 225), thereby establishing the possibility of
capturing Suppes’s hierarchies syntactically. Similarly, there is no reason why, for
example, van Fraassen’s concept of embedding cannot be captured in syntactic
terms. One attempt to this effect has been undertaken by Turney (1990), who in-
troduces the concept of implanting as the syntactic counterpart to van Fraassen’s
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embedding, that is, isomorphism to empirical substructures of a theory.18 Finally,
if the model or set theoretic formalism of semantic approaches does not receive
a formal interpretation at all, the formalism already is syntactical, as I have ar-
gued in §4. Trivially, the relation between theory and observation can then be
captured syntactically if it can be captured semantically.
That, conversely, the use of a subvocabulary is not restricted to syntactic ap-
proaches can be seen from the model theoretic concept of a reduct of a structure,
in which all those extensions not belonging to the terms of a subvocabulary of V
are eliminated (Hodges 1993, 9). The definition of a reduct for a structure can be
extended to also cover pure structures by using the set of positions in a structure
rather then the set of terms in a vocabulary. In fact, within a semantic approach,
Suppes (1959) has suggested a criterion of meaning that relies on such a biparti-
tion (cf. Lutz 2012a, §6.5).
There is, however, the possibility that the relation of a theory to the observa-
tions cannot be captured at all in any formalism, for example because the relation
is achieved through completely implicit, contextual knowledge of the scientists.
In this case, however, neither syntactic nor semantic approaches can capture the
relation.
6 Combining semantic and syntactic approaches
In light of the discussion, semantic and syntactic approaches appear to be on a par
with respect to their connection to the world, their language independence, and
their treatment of models. In light of the inter-translatability of analyses based on
pure structures with model theoretic analyses, and their inter-translatability with
syntactic analyses, this is unsurprising. The role of model theoretic approaches
as a mediator is interesting, and its close relation to both of the approaches may
explain the conviction on both sides that little is amiss—in a syntactic approach,
model theoretic results are easy to have through Tarski’s definition of truth in
a structure, and in semantic approaches, even a structure understood as a tuple
can easily be fitted with a vocabulary, making available all the model theoretic
concepts and results. Finally, without formal interpretation, either approach can
be directly interpreted in the other—set theory can be formalized in predicate
logic and vice versa.
These intertranslatability results are nothing but positive: They allow com-
paring more specific versions of the approaches, for example approaches in first
order predicate logic and approaches in first order model theory. Here, standard
model theory has already led to major results, which only had to be put to work,
for example by Przełe˛cki (1969) and van Benthem (1982, 2011). Taking the close
relation seriously also allows identifying a problem in either approach if the prob-
18Unfortunately, in his definitions of ‘isomorphism’ and ‘embeddability’ Turney (1990, def. 2,
5) allows a re-ordering of a structure’s extensions, thereby making examples like that of Halvorson
(2012, 192) and the translation of ‘temperature’ into ‘pression’ possible.
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lem has already been identified in the other. In general, those problems of syntac-
tic approaches that do not stem from formal interpretations of axiomatizations
in first order logic have their analogues in semantic approaches, as the above ex-
amples of the connection to the world and language dependence show. Another
case in point is the conclusion by Chakravartty (2001, 326, §1) that “[r]ealism
on the semantic view is by no means impossible, but faced with precisely those
familiar, perennial difficulties of reference and correspondence that some seman-
ticists think their approach does without”. As a final example, consider theories
that cannot be fruitfully formalized. Typically, those theories are considered a
problem for syntactic approaches (see, for example Suppe 1974a, 63 and Beatty
1980, appendix 1), but the above results show that if a theory is not fruitfully for-
malizable in a syntactic approach, neither is it so formalizable in a semantic one.
More constructively, the results also show that if a theory is fruitfully formaliz-
able semantically, it is also fruitfully formalizable syntactically.
A related constructive use of the close relation between the approaches is the
transfer of solutions from one view to the other. One example is the definitional
expansion of theories to allow the identification of theories with formally differ-
ent structures in semantic views (§3). As noted, this goes far beyond the pure
avoidance of assigning different names to the same sets. Other examples are the
concept of a substructure in model theory, which captures the syntactic notion of
a subvocabulary, the use of the Ramsey sentence by Sneed (1979), which mirrors
its use in the Received View, and the syntactic description of empirical embed-
dings. With respect to the relation between the Received View and van Fraassen’s
conception of scientific theories, Turney (1990, 449) concludes:
We see now that there is a syntactic method, which is equivalent to
his semantic method. The moral is this: The relevant distinction here
is not between syntax and semantics. [ . . . ] It is between two ways of
linking theory and observation: Correspondence rules versus embed-
ding/implanting.
Turney assumes in this quote that van Fraassen’s notion of embedding cannot
be captured by correspondence rules, but by his notion of implanting. Neither
assumption is true (Lutz 2012a, §4.2.1, §4.2.3), but the importance of Turney’s
point is this: If the difference between syntactic and semantic approaches is seen
as one of formulation, it is possible to search for commonalities between the
views and to transfer solutions from one approach to the other. On a meta-level,
I therefore do hold the position of the critics of syntactic approaches: The lan-
guage in which an analysis is phrased, whether it uses pure or indexed structures,
structures alone, or possible structures and an object language, matters very little.
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